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Abstract
We investigate the influence of fake and traditional, fact-based, news outlets on Twitter during
the 2016 US presidential election. Using a comprehensive dataset of 171 million tweets covering the
five months preceding election day, we identify 30 million tweets, sent by 2.2 million users, which are
classified as spreading fake and extremely biased news, based on a list of news outlets curated from
independent fact-checking organizations, and traditional news from right to left. We find that 29%
of these tweets disseminate fake or extremely biased news. We fully characterize the networks of
users spreading fake and traditional news and find the most influential users. Contrary to traditional
news, where influencers are mainly journalists or news outlets with verified Twitter accounts, e.g.
@FoxNews and @CNN, the majority of fake news influencers have unverified or deleted accounts. In
particular, accounts with seemingly deceiving profiles are found among the top fake and extremely
biased influencers. We find that the three top influencers spreading (i.e. re-tweeting) fake news
websites are @PrisonPlanet, @RealAlexJones and @zerohedge and re-tweeting extremely bias news
websites are @realDonaldTrump, @DailyCaller and @BreitbartNews. To understand how fake news
influenced Twitter opinion during the presidential election, we perform a Granger-causality test
between the time series of activity of influencers and the supporters of each presidential candidate:
Trump and Clinton. Two different news spreading mechanisms are revealed: (i) The influencers
spreading traditional center and left leaning news largely determine (Granger-cause) the opinion of
the Clinton supporters. (ii) Remarkably, this causality is reversed for the fake news: the opinion of
Trump supporters largely Granger-causes the dynamics of influencers spreading fake and extremely
biased news.
1 Introduction
Recent social and political events, such as the 2016 US presidential election [1], have been marked
by a growing number of so-called “fake news”, i.e. deliberate misinformation, shared on social media
platforms. While misinformation and propaganda have existed since ancient times [2], their impor-
tance and influence in the age of social media is still not clear. Indeed, massive digital misinformation
has been designated as a major technological and geopolitical risk by the 2013 report of the World
Economic Forum [3]. A substantial number of studies have recently investigated the phenomena
of misinformation in online social networks such as Facebook [4–9] Twitter [10, 11], YouTube [12] or
Wikipedia [13]. These investigations, as well as theoretical modeling [14,15], suggest that confirmation
bias [16] and social influence results in the emergence, in online social networks, of user communities
with homogeneous beliefs, i.e. echo chambers, where unsubstantiated claims are as likely to propagate
virally than other information [6, 17]. A comprehensive investigation of the spread of true and false
news in Twitter also showed that false news is characterized by a faster and broader diffusion than
true news mainly due to the attraction of people to the novelty of false news [11]. The polarization
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in communities is also observed in the consumption of news in general [18, 19] and corresponds with
political alignment [20]. Recent works also revealed the role of bots, i.e. automated accounts, in the
spread of misinformation [11, 21, 22]. In particular, Shao et al. [23] found that, during the 2016 US
presidential election on Twitter, bots were responsible for the early promotion of misinformation and
that they targeted influential users through replies and mentions. These results have raised the ques-
tion of whether such misinformation campaigns could alter public opinion and endanger the integrity
of the presidential election [22].
Here, we use a dataset of 171 million tweets sent by 11 million users covering almost the whole activ-
ity of users regarding the two main US presidential candidates, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump,
collected during the five months preceding election day. This dataset was collected using the Twitter
Search API using the two following queries: trump OR realdonaldtrump OR donaldtrump and hillary
OR clinton OR hillaryclinton and was used to extract and analyze Twitter opinion trend in our previ-
ous work [24]. Instead of investigating a set of specific true or false stories as has been done in several
previous work [5, 11, 25], we are interested in the differential influence of the entire media landscape
on Twitter activity. We compare the spread of news coming from websites known to display fake
news with the spread of news coming from traditional, fact-based, news outlets with different political
orientations. We investigate the diffusion in Twitter of each type of media to understand what is their
relative importance, who are the news influencers and how they drive the dynamics of Twitter opinion.
We find that, among the 30 million tweets containing an URL directing to a news outlet website, 29%
point toward websites containing fake news, conspiracy theory or extremely biased news. In order
to estimate the importance of automated accounts, We separate tweets posted from official Twitter
clients from the other third-party clients (non-official clients). Third-party clients represents a va-
riety of applications, form applications mainly used by professional for automating some tasks (e.g.
www.sprinklr.com or dlvrit.com) to manually programmed bots, and are used to post ≤ 8% of the
total number of tweets. When considering only tweets originating from non-official Twitter clients,
we see a tweeting rate for users tweeting links to websites containing fake news more than four times
larger than for traditional media, suggesting a larger role of bots in the diffusion of fake news. We
classify 30 million tweets with URLs according to the type of media they direct to. Based on a pro-
fessionally curated list of online information sources (available at www.opensources.co), we consider
two categories of misinformation, fake news and extremely biased news, and we separate the tradi-
tional, fact-based, news outlets in five categories according to their political orientation. We detail
our classification in Section (2.1). We reconstruct the information flow networks by following retweets
tree for each type of media. We find that user diffusing fake news form more connected networks with
less heterogeneous connectivity than users in traditional news diffusion networks. While influencers,
identified using collective influence algorithm [26], of traditional news outlets are journalists and public
figures with verified Twitter accounts, we find that a large number of influencers of fake news and
extremely biased websites are unknown users or users with deleted Twitter accounts. The activity
of each candidate supporters is measured thanks to a machine learning approach previously validates
in Ref. [24]. The presence of two clusters of media sources and their relation with the supporters
of each candidate is revealed by the analysis of the correlation of their activity. Finally, we explore
the dynamics between the influencers and the supporters activity with a Granger-causality analysis.
Granger-causality allows to estimate how the information in a first time series can be used to predict
future values of a second time series [27]. We find two different mechanisms for the dynamics of fake
news and traditional news. For traditional news, we find that the influencers of center and left-leaning
news outlets, who are mainly journalists, are driving the activity of Clinton supporters, who represent
the majority in Twitter [24]. For fake and extremely biased news, we find that it is the activity of
Trump supporters that governs their dynamics and influencers of fake and extremely biased news are
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merely following it.
Using a novel approach, we show the polarization of the users’ activity in different clusters and
we provide new insights into the dynamics of news diffusion, the role of media influencers and the
importance of misinformation on Twitter opinion dynamics.
2 Results
2.1 News spreading in Twitter
To characterize the spreading of news in Twitter we analyze all the tweets in our dataset that con-
tained at least one URL (Uniform Resource Locator, i.e. web addresses) linking to a website outside
of Twitter. We first separate URL in two main categories based on the websites they link to: websites
containing misinformation and traditional, fact-based, news outlets. We use the term traditional in
the sense that news outlets in this category follow the traditional rules of fact-based journalism and
therefore also include recently created news outlets (e.g. vox.com). Classifying outlets as spreading
misinformation or reliable information is inherently subject to a level of subjectivity and impreci-
sion that should be kept in mind when interpreting our results. We include a finer classification of
news outlets spreading misinformation in two sub-categories: fake news and extremely biased news.
We base our classification of misinformation websites on a curated list of fake, false, conspiratorial,
and misleading news websites compiled by a research team of Merrimack College, USA, freely avail-
able at www.opensources.co. Fake news websites are websites that have been flagged as spreading
fabricated news or conspiracy theories by several fact-checking groups. Extremely biased websites in-
clude more controversial websites that do not necessarily publish fabricated information but “distort
facts and may rely on propaganda, decontextualized information, or opinions distorted as facts” (see
www.opensources.co). Opensources.co classify websites by analyzing several aspects, such as if they
try to imitate existing reliable websites, if they were flagged by fact-checking groups (www.snopes.com,
www.hoax-slayer.net or www.factcheck.org), or by analyzing the sources cited in articles (the full
explanation of their methods is available at www.opensources.co). More details about our classifica-
tion of websites spreading misinformation is available in the Methods section.
We also use a finer classification for traditional news websites based on their political orientation. We
identify the most important traditional news outlets by manually inspecting the list of top 150 URL’s
hostnames, representing 71% of all URLs, shared on Twitter. We only take into account the top 150
hostnames since adding a less popular hostnames would change the total amount of considered URLs
by less than 0.2%. Based on information from the websites www.allsides.com, which rates media
bias using a combination of several methods such as blind surveys, community feedback and inde-
pendent research (see www.allsides.com/media-bias/media-bias-rating-methods for a detailed
explanation of the media bias rating methodology used by AllSides), and mediabiasfactcheck.com,
which scores media bias by evaluating wording, sourcing and story choices as well as political endorse-
ment (see mediabiasfactcheck.com/methodology/ for an explanation of Media Bias Fact Check
methodology), we classified each news outlet according to their political orientation in the follow-
ing five categories: left, left-leaning, center, right-leaning and right. The detail of our classification
could be discussed, for example some media that we considered as center may be thought to be left-
leaning or some left-leaning media could be classified as left, and this fact has to be kept in mind
while interpreting our results. However, as we will see, the details of the media political classification
do not influence greatly our results as we see patterns encompassing several media categories emerging.
We report the hostnames in each categories along with the number of tweets with a URL point-
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ing toward them in Tables 6 and 7. Using this final separation in seven classes, we identify in our
dataset (we give the top hostname as en example in parenthesis): 330 hostnames corresponding to fake
news websites (e.g. thegatewaypundit.com), 110 hostnames for extremely biased news websites (e.g.
breitbart.com), 13 hostnames for left news websites (e.g. huffingtonpost.com), 17 hostnames for
left leaning news websites (e.g. nytimes.com), 15 hostnames for center news websites (e.g. cnn.com),
2 hostnames for right leaning websites (e.g. washingtontimes.com) and 13 hostnames for right web-
sites (e.g. foxnews.com). We only found two media websites in the right leaning category, which
reflects the fact that right medias seem to have a stronger polarization than left media on Twitter.
Consequently, we group right leaning and right media in a unique category during our analysis.
We identified 30 million tweets with an URLs directing to a news outlet website, sent by 2.2 million
users. An important point when comparing the absolute number of tweets and users contributing to
the spread of different types of news is the bias introduced by the keywords selected during the data
collection. Indeed, if we had used keywords or targeting specific news outlets or hashtags concerning
specific news event, it would be impossible to perfectly control the bias toward fake and reliable news
or the political orientation representation of the tweet sample. Here, we used neutral keywords in
term of media representation, the names of the two main candidates to the presidential election (see
Methods), in order to collect a sample representative of the real coverage of the election on Twitter
by all media sources.
Table 1 shows the number of tweets and the number of users having sent tweets with a URL pointing
to a website belonging to one of the seven media categories we defined. Figure 1 shows the number
of tweets and users grouped in four categories: fake & extremely biased news, right & right leaning
news, center news and left & left leaning news. We see a large number of tweets linking to fake
news websites, 3.8 million, and extremely biased news websites, 4.7 million. However, the majority of
tweets linking to news outlets points toward left leaning news websites, 7.1 million, closely followed
by center news websites with 6.8 million. Tweets directing to left and left leaning news websites
represent together 35% of the total and tweets directing towards center news outlets represents 32%
(see Fig. 1a). Tweets directing to fake and extremely biased news websites representing a consid-
erable share of 29%. When considering the number of distinct users having sent the tweets instead
of the number of tweets, the share of left and left leaning websites increases to 42% and the share
of center news to 32%, while the share going to fake news and extremely biased news is equal to
14% (see Fig. 1b). Our first results show that the number of tweets linking to websites producing
fake and extremely biased news is comparable with the number for center, left and left leaning media
outlets. However, when taking into account the heterogeneous activity of users, a different picture
Nt pt Nu pu Nt/Nu pt,n/o pu,n/o Nt,n/o/Nu,n/o
fake news 3 837 826 0.13 248 937 0.06 15.42 0.19 0.04 79.32
extremely biased news 4 698 708 0.16 374 387 0.10 12.55 0.09 0.03 33.31
right news 3 419 828 0.12 388 150 0.10 8.81 0.10 0.04 22.11
right leaning news 272 395 0.01 91 720 0.02 2.97 0.14 0.05 8.30
center news 6 774 099 0.23 1 062 149 0.27 6.38 0.18 0.04 27.01
left leaning news 7 137 544 0.24 1 214 721 0.31 5.88 0.13 0.04 17.91
left news 3 241 973 0.11 539 800 0.14 6.01 0.12 0.05 14.01
Table 1: Tweet and user volume corresponding to each media category in Twitter. Number, Nt,
and proportion, pt, of tweets with a URL pointing to a website belonging to one of the seven media categories.
Number, Nu, and proportion, pu, of users having sent the corresponding tweets, and average number of tweets
per user, Nt/Nu, for each category. Proportion of tweets sent by non-official clients, pt,n/o, proportion of users
having sent at least one tweet from an non-official client, pu,n/o, and average number of tweets per user sent
from non-official clients, Nt,n/o/Nu,n/o.
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Figure 1: Importance of different types of news outlets in Twitter. Number of distinct tweets (a)
and number of distinct users having sent tweets (b) with a URL pointing to a website belonging to one of
following categories: fake or extremely biased, right or right leaning, center and left or left-leaning news outlets.
While the tweet volume of fake and extremely biased news is comparable to the tweet volumes of center and
left & left volume (a), users posting fake and extremely biased news are around twice more active (see Tab. 1).
Consequently, the share of users posting fake and extremely biased news (b) is smaller (14%) than the share of
tweets directing toward fake and extremely biased news websites (29%).
emerges. Indeed, users posting links to fake news or extremely biased websites are, in average, more
active than users posting links to other news websites (see Tab. 1). In particular, they post around
twice the number of tweets compared to users posting links towards center or left leaning news outlets.
Table 1 also shows the proportion of tweets sent by, and users using, non-official Twitter clients. This
allows to evaluate the importance of automated posting in each category. We detail our classification
of official Twitter clients in the Methods. We see that the two top categories are fake news and center
news with almost 20% of tweets being sent from non-official accounts. When considering the proportion
of users sending tweets from non-official clients, the number are very similar for all categories, around
4%, showing that the automation of posting plays an important role across media categories. Indeed,
non-official clients includes a broad range of clients, from “social bots” to applications used to facilitate
the management of professional Twitter accounts. However, a large discrepancy between sources arises
when we consider the average number of tweets per users sent from non-official clients (see Tab. 1).
Users using non-official clients to send tweets with links directing to websites displaying fake news
tweeted an average of 79.32 times during the collection period, which is more than twice the value for
other types of news outlets. This high activity from non-official clients suggest an abnormal presence
of bots. The role of bots in the diffusion of fake news has already been documented [23] as well as their
presence in the Twitter discussions during 2016 US election [22] using a machine learning classification
to detect bots [28].
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2.2 Networks of information flow
To investigate the flow of information we build the retweet networks for each category of news websites,
i.e. when a user u retweets (a retweet allows a user to rebroadcast the tweet of an other user) the tweet
of a user v that contains a URL linking to a website belonging to one of the news media category, we
add a link, or edge, going from node v to node u in the network. We do not consider multiple links
with the same direction between the same two users and neither consider self-links, i.e. when a user
retweet her/his own tweet. Directed links of such networks represent the flow of information between
Twitter users. The out-degree of a node is its number of out-going links and is equal to the number
of different users that have retweeted at least one of her/his tweets. Its in-degree is its number of
in-going links and represents the number of different users she/he retweeted.
Figure 2 shows the networks formed by the top 100 influencers of each retweet graph. We explain in
Section (2.3) and in the Methods how the influencers are identified. The characteristics of each retweet
graphs are shown in Table 2. A clear difference is apparent between the graphs representing the flow
of fake and extremely biased news and the graphs for left, left leaning and center news. The left, left
leaning and center news outlets correspond to larger networks in term of number of nodes and edges,
revealing their larger reach and influence in Twitter. However the retweet networks corresponding
to fake and extremely biased news outlets are the most dense with an average degree 〈k〉 between
6 and 7, more than twice the number for left, left leaning and center news. The retweet network
for right & right leaning news has characteristics in between those two groups with a slightly larger
size than the networks for fake and extremely biased news and a larger average degree than left, left
leaning and center news. These results show that users spreading fake and extremely biased news,
although in smaller numbers, are not only more active in average, as shown in Tab. 1, but also more
connected indicating that the audience of fake and extremely biased news form tighter community
structures which may facilitate the spread of misinformation among themselves. Table 2 also shows
that the center and left leaning networks have the most heterogeneous out-degree distribution and the
fake news retweet networks has the less heterogeneous out-degree distribution. The heterogeneity of
the degree distribution plays an important role in spreading processes on networks as a larger degree
heterogeneity indicates the presence of high degree nodes that accelerate the diffusion in the entire
networks [29,30]. This suggests that different mechanisms of information diffusion could be at play in
the center and left leaning news networks, where high degree nodes may play a more important role,
than in the fake and extremely biased news networks.
N nodes N edges 〈k〉 σ(kout)/ 〈k〉 σ(kin)/ 〈k〉 max(kout) max(kin)
fake news 207 222 1 465 265 7.07 28± 2 2.70± 0.03 42 977 1232
extremely biased 306 919 1 953 136 6.36 34± 4 2.80± 0.02 51 845 648
right & right leaning 337 772 1 665 718 4.93 47± 8 2.68± 0.02 84 739 464
center 894 899 2 762 013 3.09 92± 38 2.80± 0.04 229 605 559
left leaning 998 438 3 416 201 3.42 67± 17 3.36± 0.06 145 047 826
left 421 415 1 320 756 3.13 50± 10 3.42± 0.05 58 832 622
Table 2: Retweet networks characteristics for each news source categories. We show the number of
nodes and edges (links) of the networks, the average degree, 〈k〉 = 〈kin〉 = 〈kout〉, (the in-/out-degree of a node
is the number of in-going/out-going links attached to it). The out-degree of a node, i.e. a user, is equal to the
number of different users that have retweeted at least one of her/his tweets. Its in-degree represents the number
of different users she/he retweeted. The ratio of the standard deviation and the average of the in- and out-degree
distribution, σ(kin)/ 〈k〉 and σ(kout)/ 〈k〉, measures the heterogeneity of the connectivity of each networks. As
the standard deviation of heavy-tailed degree distributions can depend on the network size, we computed the
values of σ(kin)/ 〈k〉 and σ(kout)/ 〈k〉 by taking the average, and standard error, of 1000 independent samples,
of 200 000 values each, drawn from the in- and out- degree distributions of each network.
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Figure 2: Retweet networks formed by the top 100 influencers of each media category. Retweet
networks for fake news (a), extremely biased news (b) right & right leaning news (c), center news (d), left
leaning news (e) and left news (f) showing only the top 100 influencers ranked according to their collective
influence. The direction of the links represents the flow of information between users. The size of the nodes is
proportional to their CIout values and the shade of the nodes’ color represents their out-degree from dark (high
out-degree) to light (low out-degree). The network of fake (a) and extremely biased (b) are characterized by
a connectivity that is larger in average and less heterogeneous than for networks of traditional news (see also
Tab. 2). 7
The difference in degree heterogeneity is also visible in the difference between the in- and out-degrees
maxima. The out-degree maxima of the center and left leaning news graphs are the largest revealing
the existence of highly retweeted users, while it is the fake news graph that has the largest in-degree
maximum due to the presence of a user having retweeted more than 1000 other users posting links
toward fake news websites. While inspecting specific accounts is not the goal of this study, looking
at the two accounts with the maximum kout and kin reveals an interesting contrast between users of
both graphs. The user with the largest out-degree of the center news graph is the verified account of
the Cable News Network, CNN, (@CNN ), which posts regularly links towards its own website using
mainly the non-official professional client Sprinklr (www.sprinklr.com). The user with the largest
in-degree of the fake news graph is the user @Patriotic Folks, which, at the moment of this writing,
seems to belong to a fake, or at least deceiving user, whose profile description contains the hashtag
#MAGA and refer to a website belonging to our fake news website list (thetruthdivision.com).
The name of the account is “Annabelle Trump” and its profile picture is a young woman wearing
cow-boy clothes (a reverse image search on the web reveals that this profile image is not authentic as
it comes in fact from the catalog of a website selling western clothes). Most of its tweet are sent from
the official Twitter Web Client, suggesting that a real person is managing the account, and contains
URLs directing to the same fake news website. However, having a high in-degree does not indicate
that this user has an important influence. Indeed, its out-degree is approximately 3.5 times smaller
than its in-degree and, as we explain in the next section, influence is poorly measured by local network
properties such as in- or out-degree.
2.3 Media influencers
In order to uncover the most influential users of each retweet network, we use the Collective Influence
(CI) algorithm [26] which is based on the solution of the optimal network percolation, i.e. the problem
of finding the minimal number of nodes to remove in order to destroy the network’s giant component.
The CI algorithm considers influence as an emergent collective property, not as a local property such
as the node’s degree, and has been shown to be able to identify super-spreaders of information in
social networks [31, 32]. We apply here the CI algorithm to directed networks, by only considering
the out-degree of a node and therefore identifying the most influential sources of information in each
networks (see Methods). For a Twitter user to be highly ranked by the CI algorithm, she/he does
not necessarily need to be directly retweeted by many users, but she/he needs to have several highly
retweeted users at close network distance from her/him (see Methods).
Table 3 shows the top 25 influencers, ranked using CI, for each media category. The top influencers for
each category are: @PrisonPlanet for fake news, @realDonaldTrump for extremely biased, @FoxNews
for right & right leaning, @CNN for center, @nytimes for left leaning and @HuffPost for left news. A
check-mark (X) is added next to the accounts that are verified by Twitter. Verifying its accounts is a
feature offered by Twitter, that “lets people know that an account of public interest is authentic”
(help.twitter.com/en/managing-your-account/about-twitter-verified-accounts). We also
show the number of verified, unverified and deleted accounts among the top 100 influencers of each
category in Fig. 3 and the networks they form are shown in Fig. 2.
We find that top influencers of left, left-leaning and center news are almost uniquely verified accounts
belonging to news outlets or journalists. A very different situation for influencers of the fake news and
extremely biased news websites is revealed, where, among official accounts of websites and journalists,
we also find a large number of unknown, unverified, users that are not public figures but are important
influencers in Twitter. We also find deleted accounts, that could have been deleted either by Twitter
for infringing their rules and policies or by the users themselves, in the fake and extremely biased
news influencers. The list of the right & right leaning news top influencers form a mix of verified
8
Figure 3: Types of top influencers accounts per media category. Proportion of verified (green),
unverified (red) and deleted (black) accounts among the top 100 influencers in each media category.
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rank fake news extremely biased news right & right leaning news
(7 verified, 2 deleted, 19 unverified) (14 verified, 1 deleted, 10 unverified) (22 verified, 0 deleted, 3 unverified)
1 @PrisonPlanetX @realDonaldTrumpX @FoxNewsX
2 @RealAlexJonesX @DailyCallerX @realDonaldTrumpX
3 @zerohedge @BreitbartNewsX @dcexaminerX
4 @DRUDGE REPORT @wikileaksX @DRUDGE REPORT
5 deleted @DRUDGE REPORT @nypostX
6 @realDonaldTrumpX @WayneDupreeShowX @DailyMailX
7 @mitchellviiX @LindaSuhler @AllenWestX
8 @gatewaypunditX @mitchellviiX @FoxNewsInsiderX
9 deleted @LouDobbsX @RealJamesWoodsX
10 @TruthFeedNews @PrisonPlanetX @LouDobbsX
11 @RickRWells @FreeBeaconX @KellyannePollsX
12 @V of Europe @DonaldJTrumpJrX @foxandfriendsX
13 @Lagartija Nix @benshapiroX @WashTimesX
14 @DonaldJTrumpJrX @gerfingerpoken @PrisonPlanetX
15 @ThePatriot143 @TeamTrumpX @TeamTrumpX
16 @infowars @Italians4Trump @wikileaksX
17 @KitDaniels1776 deleted @FoxBusinessX
18 @Italians4Trump @KellyannePollsX @IngrahamAngleX
19 @ Makada @JohnFromCranber @LifeZetteX
20 @BigStick2013 @DanScavinoX @theblazeX
21 @Miami4Trump @gerfingerpoken2 @foxnewspoliticsX
22 @JayS2629 @ThePatriot143 @BIZPACReview
23 @conserv tribuneX @true pundit @TheLastRefuge2
24 @MONAKatOILS @ARnews1936 @JasonMillerinDCX
25 @ARnews1936 @Lagartija Nix @DonaldJTrumpJrX
rank center news left leaning news left news
(24 verified, 0 deleted, 1 unverified) (25 verified, 0 deleted, 0 unverified) (21 verified, 0 deleted, 4 unverified)
1 @CNNX @nytimesX @HuffPostX
2 @thehillX @washingtonpostX @TIMEX
3 @politicoX @ABCX @RawStoryX
4 @CNNPoliticsX @NBCNewsX @HuffPostPolX
5 @ReutersX @SlateX @TPMX
6 @WSJX @PolitiFactX @MotherJonesX
7 @thedailybeastX @CBSNewsX @MSNBCX
8 @NateSilver538X @voxdotcomX @joshtpmX
9 @APX @ABCPoliticsX @samsteinX
10 @USATODAYX @ezrakleinX @mmfaX
11 @businessX @guardianX @DavidCornDCX
12 @AP PoliticsX @nytpoliticsX @dailykosX
13 @bpoliticsX @NYDailyNewsX @thinkprogressX
14 @FiveThirtyEightX @BuzzFeedNewsX @JuddLegumX
15 @DRUDGE REPORT @MediaiteX @nxthompsonX
16 @jaketapperX @nytopinionX @ariannahuffX
17 @cnnbrkX @CillizzaCNNX @jonathanchaitX
18 @businessinsiderX @HillaryClintonX @blackvoicesX
19 @AC360X @MSNBCX @WeNeededHillary
20 @cnniX @KFILEX @activist360
21 @KellyannePollsX @TheAtlanticX @politicususa
22 @BBCWorldX @SopanDebX @JoyAnnReidX
23 @brianstelterX @BuzzFeedX @PoliticusSarahX
24 @KFILEX @NewsweekX @aterkelX
25 @realDonaldTrumpX @FahrentholdX @mcspocky
Table 3: Top 25 CI influencers of the retweet networks corresponding to each media category.
Verified users are in green and have a checkmark (X) next to their user name. Verifying an accounts is a feature
offered by Twitter for public figures. Unverified accounts are shown in red and accounts that have been deleted,
either bu Twitter or by the users themselves are shown in black.
and unverified accounts and share many influencers with the lists of fake and extremely biased news
influencers. The overlap between the different set of top 100 influencers is given in Tab. 5.
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We distinguish three categories of unverified accounts: 1) unverified accounts that are not necessarily
misleading or deceiving, for example @zerohedge, @DRUDGE REPORT or @TruthFeedNews make
their affiliation to their respective news websites clear, although their identities or the ones of their
websites administrators is not always clear; 2) unverified accounts that make their motif clear in their
choice of screen-name, e.g. @Italians4Trump, @Miami4Trump or @WeNeededHillary, although the real
identity of the persons behind such accounts is also usually undisclosed; 3) finally, unverified accounts
that seem to be real persons with profile pictures and user names, e.g @Lagartija Nix, @ThePatriot143,
@BigStick2013, @LindaSuhler or @gerfingerpoken, but are not public figures. Whether such users are
authentic, social bots or fake users operated by someone else is not clear. However, our results show
that such users are not present in the top influencers of the center and left-leaning news, while they
have a high prevalence in the fake, extremely biased, right and right leaning categories.
2.4 News spreading dynamics
To investigate the news spreading dynamics of the different media categories on Twitter, we analyze
the correlations between the time series of tweeting rate measured for each category. The Twitter
activity time series are constructed by counting the number of tweets with a URL directing toward a
website belonging to each of the media category at a 15 minute resolution. We find that a 15 minute
resolution offers a sufficiently detailed sampling of Twitter activity. Indeed, a representative time scale
of Twitter activity is given by the characteristic retweet delay time, i.e. the typical time between an
original tweet and its retweet. We find that the median time of the retweet delay distribution in our
dataset is 1 h 57 min and the distribution has a log-normal shape (first quartile at 20 min and third
quartile at 9 h 11 min). We tested the consistency of our results using a resolution of 5 min and 1 h
and did not see significant changes. In addition to the activity related to each media group, we also
consider the time series of the activity of the supporters of each presidential candidates. Supporters are
identified using a combination of machine learning, natural language processing based on the hashtag
co-occurrence network [24].
We removed the trend and circadian cycles present in the time series with widely used STL (seasonal-
trend decomposition procedure based on Loess) method [33], which is a robust iterative filtering
method allowing to separate a time series in seasonal (in this case, daily), trend and remainder
components (see Methods). Figure 4 shows examples of the residual component of activity time series
for the top 100 left leaning influencers the Clinton supporters, the top 100 fake news influencers and
the Trump supporters.
Figure 5a shows the Pearson correlation coefficient computed between the activity time series corre-
sponding to each media group and to the activity of each supporters. The separation of the media
sources in two correlated clusters is revealed when using a threshold of r = 0.50 on the cross-correlation
coefficients. Figure 5b shows the graph obtained when considering only correlation coefficients larger
than r = 0.50 . The first activity cluster (indicated by a red square) comprises the fake, extremely
and right & right leaning news with cross-correlation coefficients 0.51 ≤ r ≤ 0.57. The second ac-
tivity cluster (indicated by a blue square) is made of the center, left and left leaning news sources
(0.57 ≤ r ≤ 0.63). We observe the following patterns between the media groups and the support-
ers dynamics: the activity of Clinton supporters has a higher correlation with the second cluster
(0.66 ≤ r ≤ 0.71) than with the first one (0.33 ≤ r ≤ 0.39) while the activity of Trump supporters
is equally correlated with the two clusters (0.55 ≤ r ≤ 0.60). The total activity of supporters, com-
puted as the sum of the activity of both supporter groups, has a larger correlation with the second
cluster (0.67 ≤ r ≤ 0.70) than with the first one (0.45 ≤ r ≤ 0.50), revealing that Clinton supporters
dominate Twitter activity.
These results indicate that the media included in the two clusters respond to two different news dy-
namics and show that the polarization of news observed in previous works [18–20] is also visible in a
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Figure 4: Example of Granger-causality relation between the activity of influencers and sup-
porters. (a) Activity time series corresponding to the top 100 left leaning influencers (black) and the Clinton
supporters (blue, right vertical axis). (b) Activity time series of the top 100 fake news influencers (black) and
the Trump supporters (red, right vertical axis). We show the residuals of the STL filtering after the removal
of the seasonal (daily) and trend components. A Granger-causality relation is apparent from the top 100 left
leaning influencers to the Clinton supporters (a), i.e. the information of the influencers time series helps predict
the Clinton activity time series. This is apparent as peaks in the left leaning influencers activity (black) tend
to precede peaks in the activity of Clinton supporters (blue). A Granger-causality relation from the Trump
supporters to the the top 100 fake news influencers (b) is also apparent.
separation in their activity
The cross-correlations between activity time series informs us about their temporal relation, however
they do not allow to draw conclusions about causation between time series. In order to investigate
the causal relations between news media sources and Twitter dynamics, we use the statistical test
of Granger-causality [27] between the activity of news influencers and supporters of the presidential
candidates. A stationary stochastic process, represented by a time series Yt, is said to Granger-cause a
stochastic process Xt when a regression using the past values of Yt and Xt is better able to predict Xt
than the same regression model using only the past values of Xt [27]. We use a linear autoregressive
model for the time series:
Xt =
m∑
j=1
ajXt−j + t, (1)
where t is a white noise and m is the order of model. The null-hypothesis of the test is that the
predictive error of this model is not significantly decreased when adding the lagged values of Yt up to
lag l in the regression
Xt =
m∑
j=1
ajXt−j +
l∑
j=1
bjYt−j + t, (2)
in other words, that the coefficients bj for i = 1, ..., l of the regression are equal to zero. As for the
cross-correlation analysis, we use the residuals of the STL filtering of the 15 min tweet volume time
series. The STL procedure removes the trend and circadian pattern in the time series, resulting in
stationary time series (the stationarity of each time series is confirmed by an augmented Dickey–Fuller
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Figure 5: Activity correlation between news outlets and supporters. (a) Pearson cross-correlation
coefficients between activity time series related to the different types of news outlets, Trump supporters and
Clinton supporters. (b) Graph showing the correlation relations between the types of news websites and the
supporters. The edges of the graph represent correlations larger than r0 = 0.5. Fake news, extremely biased
and right websites form a first cluster, indicated by a red square in (a) and shown in red in (b), while center,
left leaning and left news websites form a second cluster, indicated by a blue square in (a) and shown in blue
in (b). The activity of Trump supporters is equally correlated with all news sources, except for right leaning
news, and the activity of Clinton supporters, which represents the largest activity, is mainly correlated with the
second media cluster and only poorly with the first one.
test [34]).
Figure 6 shows the Granger-causality relations between the activity of the top 100 media influencers
of each news source category and the supporters. The p-values of the null hypothesis obtained with a
F -test between the activity of the top 100 influencers of each news source category and the activity
of the supporters are reported in Tab. 4. We consider only the activity of the top influencers since, by
the definition of CI, they are the most important sources of information and we assume that they are
the ones triggering the activity of the rest of the population. We do not include the Granger-causality
relations in-between influencers groups as the groups do not form disjoint sets. As can be seen in
Tab. 3, some influencers appear in several groups. We report the amount of overlap between pairs of
sets formed by the top 100 influencers of each category in Tab.5. The overlap between influencers
groups should be kept in mind while interpreting the Granger causality results, however, as shown
in Fig. 6, we find significantly different results for each influencers group. The value of the lag is
chosen with an information criterion by fitting a bi-variate autoregressive model to the pairs of time
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a) influencers
↙ fake news extremely biased right & right leaning center left leaning left
supporters
pro-Clinton 1.8× 10−3 8.1× 10−1 8.8× 10−2 7.9× 10−37 1.4× 10−45 2.2× 10−9
pro-Trump 7.4× 10−9 4.9× 10−1 1.1× 10−2 3.3× 10−13 2.2× 10−15 2.0× 10−7
b) supporters
↙ pro-Clinton pro-Trump
influencers
fake news 2.1× 10−11 8.6× 10−36
extremely biased 2.2× 10−9 8.9× 10−22
right & right leaning 2.6× 10−6 5.6× 10−10
center 3.4× 10−6 9.4× 10−2
left leaning 1.3× 10−6 2.8× 10−2
left 1.4× 10−22 1.9× 10−7
Table 4: p- values of the Granger causality analysis between the activity of the top 100 influencers
of each media category and the activity of the presidential candidate supporters. a) p-values obtained
with a F -test for the direction influencers Granger-cause supporters activity. b) p-values obtained with a F -test
for the direction supporters activity Granger-cause influencers activity. Smaller values of the p-values indicate
a stronger rejection of the hypothesis and therefore a stronger evidence of Granger-causality between the two
time series.
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Figure 6: Granger causality relations between influencers and supporters activity. Graph showing
the Granger causality relations between the activity of the top 100 influencers of each media category (left)
and the activity of the presidential candidate supporters (right). Arrows indicate the direction of a statistically
significant (p < p0 = 10
−7) Granger-causation between two activity time series. The width of each arrows is
proportional to the strength of the causation computed as s = log10 p0/p. The activity of center and left leaning
news influencers show the strongest Granger-causation of the supporters activity, whereas fake, extremely biased
as well as right & right leaning news influencers are shown to be following the activity of Trump supporters.
The p-values of the null hypothesis for each pair of activity time series are shown in Tab. 4.
series. We find that the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) gives the smallest lag (22), the Akaike
information criterion (AIC) gives the largest (48) and the Hannan–Quinn information criterion (HQC)
gives a lag of 37. We choose to include up to 37 lagged values, i.e. up to 9.25 h, as including more
values does not significantly changes the results. This value is consistent with our observation of
the retweet delay distribution as approximately 75% of the retweets happen during this lag. Smaller
values of the p-values indicate a stronger rejection of the null hypothesis and therefore a stronger
evidence of Granger-causality between the two time series. We only consider p-values smaller than
p0 = 10
−7 in Fig. 6 and observe that this condition is fulfilled for several pairs of time series revealing
the interdependence of the different media. However, a broad range of p-values smaller than p0
is observed which allows us to compare the strength of the causal relations and reveals interesting
patterns.
The center and left leaning news influencers have the strongest causation on the supporters activity,
with a stronger effect on the Clinton supporters than on the Trump supporters. Since the Clinton
supporters dominate Twitter activity, they also are the main drivers of the global activity. The influ-
encers of right & right leaning and extremely biased news have no significant effect on the supporters
activity. The influencers of left news and of fake news have a smaller effect on the supporters activity.
In particular, fake news influencers have Granger-causal effect on Trump supporters and no significant
effect on Clinton supporters.
The reverse Granger causality relations are also shown in Fig. 6 and in Tab. 4b revealing the presence
of feedback loops, when two time series have a significant Granger causality relation in both directions,
between the fake news influencers and the Trump supporters and between the left news influencers and
the Clinton supporters. No significant causation is revealed from the Trump or Clinton supporters
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activity toward the center and left leaning influencers. This indicate that left leaning and center
news influencers are the ones driving Twitter activity. All the other influencers are more strongly
influenced by supporters activity than are influencing it. This suggest that they are in fact following
Twitter activity rather than driving it. In particular, the activity of fake and extremely biased news
influencers is influenced by the activity of Trump supporters. These results reveal two very different
dynamics of news diffusion for traditional, center and left leaning, news and misinformation. While
traditional news dynamics is governed by journalists, fake and extremely biased news dynamics seem
to be governed by the ensemble of Trump supporters rather than by a small group of users.
3 Discussion
Using a dataset of tweets collected during the five months preceding the 2016 presidential elections,
we investigated the spread of fake news and compared its importance and influence with traditional,
fact-based, media. This dataset was previously used to analyze the opinion dynamics of Twitter users
during the 2016 election in Ref. [24] where we developed a framework to infer the opinion of each
tweet and users, based on machine learning, that we validated with national polling aggregates.
Here, we find that fake and extremely biased news represent 29% of the tweets linking to a news
outlet media. However, taking into account the difference in user activity, decreases the share of fake
and extremely biased news to 14%. Although we find approximately the same ratio of users using
automated Twitter clients in each media category, we find that automated accounts diffusing fake
news are much more active than the automated accounts diffusing other types of news. This results
confirms the role of bots in the diffusion of fake news, that has been shown using a different method
of bot detection [23], and shows that automated accounts also play a role, although smaller, in the
diffusion of traditional news.
We analyzed the structure of the information diffusion network of each category of news and found that
fake and extremely biased news diffusion networks are more densely connected and have less heteroge-
neous connectivity distributions than traditional, center and left-leaning, news diffusion networks. The
heterogeneity of the degree distribution is known to play an important role in in spreading processes
on networks [29, 30]. Spreading in networks with heterogeneous connectivity usually follows a hier-
archical dynamics in which the information propagates from higher-degree to lower-degree classes [30].
We discovered the influencers of each type of news by computing their collective influence [26] and
found very different profiles of fake and extremely biased news influencers compared to traditional
news influencers. While traditional news influencers are mostly journalists with verified Twitter ac-
counts, fake and extremely biased news influencers include unverified accounts with deceiving profiles.
Analyzing the Twitter activity dynamics of the news diffusion corresponding to each media category,
we reveal the existence of two main clusters of media in term of activity correlation which is consistent
with the findings of previous works [4–9] that revealed the separation in polarized communities of on-
fake news extremely biased right & right leaning center left leaning left
fake news 100 41 36 9 3 0
extremely biased 41 100 43 14 3 0
right & right leaning 36 43 100 17 3 0
center 9 14 17 100 19 8
left leaning 3 3 3 19 100 14
left 0 0 0 8 14 100
Table 5: Pairwise overlap of the sets of top 100 influencers of each media category.
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line social media news consumers. We also show that right news media outlets are clustered together
with fake and extremely biased news. Finally, a Granger-causality analysis between the influencers
activity and the activity of presidential candidate supporters revealed that influencers of center and
left-leaning news outlets are the ones driving Twitter activity while influencers of fake and extremely
biased news are in fact following Twitter activity, particularly Trump supporters activity.
Our investigation provides new insights into the dynamics of news diffusion in Twitter, namely our
results suggests that fake and extremely biased news are governed by a different diffusion mechanisms
than traditional center and left-leaning news. Center and left leaning news diffusion is driven by
a small number of influential users, mainly journalists, and follow a diffusion cascade in a network
with heterogeneous degree distribution which is typical of diffusion in social networks [30], while the
diffusion of fake and extremely biased news seem to not be controlled by a small set of influencers but
rather to take place in a tightly connected cluster of users that do not influence the rest of Twitter
activity.
Methods
Twitter data collection and processing
We collected tweets continuously using the Twitter Search API from June 1st, 2016 to November
8th, 2016. We gather a total of 171 million tweets in the English language, mentioning the two top
candidates from the Republican Party (Donald J. Trump) and Democratic Party (Hillary Clinton)
by using two different queries with the following keywords: hillary OR clinton OR hillaryclinton and
trump OR realdonaldtrump OR donaldtrump.
We extracted the URLs from tweets by using the expanded url field attached to each tweet containing
at least one URL. A large number of URL were redirecting links using URL shortening services (e.g.
bit.ly, dlvr.it or ift.tt). News websites sometimes also uses shortened versions of their hostnames
(e.g. cnn.it, nyti.ms, hill.cm or politi.co). We programmatically resolved shortened URLs, using
the Python Requests library, in order to find their final destination URL and extracted the hostname
of each final URL in our dataset.
Among the 55 million tweets with URLs linking outside of Twitter, we identified tweets directing to
websites containing fake news by matching the URLs’ hostname with a curated list of fake, false,
conspiratorial, and misleading news websites compiled by a research team headed by Melissa Zimdars
of Merrimack College, USA, freely available at www.opensources.co. This list classifies websites in
several categories, such as “Fake News”, “Satire” or “Junk Science”. For our study, we construct two
non-overlapping set of websites: fake news websites and extremely biased websites. The set of fake news
website is constructed by joining the hostnames from the categories “Fake News”, “Conspiracy Theory”
and “Hate News” from www.opensources.co. The following definitions of these three categories are
given on www.opensources.co
• “Fake News”: sources that entirely fabricate information, disseminate deceptive content, or
grossly distort actual news reports,
• “Conspiracy Theory”: sources that are well-known promoters of kooky conspiracy theories,
• “Hate News”: sources that actively promote racism, misogyny, homophobia, and other forms of
discrimination.
The set of extremely biased websites contains hostnames appearing in the category “Extreme Bias”
(defined as “sources that come from a particular point of view and may rely on propaganda, decon-
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textualized information, and opinions distorted as facts”) but not in any of the categories used to
construct the set of fake news.
To identify tweets that may originate from bots, we extract the name of the Twitter client used
to post each tweet from their source field and kept only tweets originating from an official twitter
client. When a programmatic access to Twitter is gained through its API to send tweets, the value
of the source field of automated tweets corresponds to the name, which must be unique, given to
the “App” during the creation of access tokens. Table 8 shows the clients we consider as official and
the corresponding number of tweets with URLs originating from each client. The number of tweets
with a URL originating from official clients represents 82% of the total number of tweets with a URL.
This simple method allows to identify tweets that have not been automated and scales very easily to
fake news extremely biased news right news
hostnames N hostnames N hostnames N
thegatewaypundit.com 761 756 breitbart.com 1 854 920 foxnews.com 970 322
truthfeed.com 554 955 dailycaller.com 759 504 dailymail.co.uk 474 846
infowars.com 478 872 dailynewsbin.com 189 257 washingtonexaminer.com 462 769
therealstrategy.com 241 354 americanthinker.com 138 321 nypost.com 441 648
conservativetribune.com 212 273 freebeacon.com 129 077 bizpacreview.com 170 770
zerohedge.com 186 706 newsninja2012.com 127 251 nationalreview.com 164 036
rickwells.us 78 736 wnd.com 103 919 lifezette.com 139 257
departed.co 72 773 newsmax.com 94 882 redstate.com 105 912
therightscoop.com 63 852 endingthefed.com 88 376 allenbwest.com 104 857
teaparty.org 48 757 truepundit.com 84 967 theconservativetreehouse.com 102 515
usapoliticsnow.com 46 252 westernjournalism.com 77 717 townhall.com 10 240
clashdaily.com 45 970 occupydemocrats.com 73 143 theblaze.com 99 029
thefederalistpapers.org 45 831 ijr.com 71 558 theamericanmirror.com 91 538
redflagnews.com 45 423 dailywire.com 67 893
thetruthdivision.com 44 486 bipartisanreport.com 66 360
thepoliticalinsider.com 36 779 ilovemyfreedom.org 54 772
donaldtrumpnews.co 29 332 100percentfedup.com 54 596 right leaning news
sputniknews.com 27 440 shareblue.com 50 880 hostnames N
angrypatriotmovement.com 27 400 pjmedia.com 46 542 washingtontimes.com 178 861
dcclothesline.com 27 072 weaselzippers.us 45 199 rt.com 93 771
frontpagemag.com 25 457 redstatewatcher.com 38 499
conservativedailypost.com 25 393 youngcons.com 35 793
beforeitsnews.com 24 827 lifenews.com 32 004
bb4sp.com 23 143 americanlookout.com 29 888
madworldnews.com 22 334 libertywritersnews.com 28 577
freedomoutpost.com 18 791 usuncut.com 27 653
investmentwatchblog.com 17 930 heatst.com 24 657
pamelageller.com 17 182 regated.com 23 825
truthrevolt.org 17 121 usapoliticstoday.com 21 969
shoebat.com 16 940 weeklystandard.com 20 807
theantimedia.org 16 399 liberalamerica.org 18 534
wearechange.org 16 330 winningdemocrats.com 15 272
usherald.com 16 135 worldnewspolitics.com 13 886
christiantimesnewspaper.com 15 881 counterjihad.com 13 031
yesimright.com 15 759 freakoutnation.com 12 504
freedomdaily.com 15 699 cnsnews.com 11 802
jewsnews.co.il 14 518 nevo.news 10 904
globalresearch.ca 14 417 rightwingnews.com 10 828
conservativebyte.com 14 203 russia-insider.com 10 550
thefreethoughtproject.com 12 821 americasfreedomfighters.com 10 255
prntly.com 12 760 chicksontheright.com 9607
usanewsinsider.com 12 671 eaglerising.com 9068
canadafreepress.com 11 810 drudgereport.com 7400
jihadwatch.org 11 786 charismanews.com 6721
usatwentyfour.com 10 347 newcenturytimes.com 6361
proudcons.com 9717 americablog.com 6179
downtrend.com 9667 lewrockwell.com 5467
eutimes.net 9033 lifesitenews.com 4877
barenakedislam.com 9031 thenewamerican.com 4867
readconservatives.news 9007 americannewsx.com 3907
Table 6: Top 50 hostnames in the categories fake, extremely biased, right and right leaning news.
We also show the number of tweets with a URL pointing toward each hostname. Tweets with several URLs are
counted multiple times.
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large datasets contrary to more sophisticated methods [28]. Advanced bots might not be detected by
our method, but this is also a problem for more advanced methods that relies on a training set of
known bots [28]. We remove all tweets sent from non-official clients when computing the activity of
supporters but we keep them when building the retweet networks, as we want to include automated
accounts that play a role in the diffusion of news.
3.1 Collective influence algorithm in directed networks
We use the Collective Influence (CI) algorithm [26] applied to directed networks to find the most
influential nodes of the information retweet networks. The Collective Influence algorithm is based on
the solution of the optimal percolation of random networks which consists of identifying the minimal
set of nodes, the super-spreaders, whose removal would dismember the network in many disconnected
and non-extensive components. The fragmentation of the network is measured by the size of the
center news left leaning news left news
hostnames N hostnames N hostnames N
cnn.com 2 126 941 nytimes.com 1 811 627 huffingtonpost.com 996 546
thehill.com 1 200 123 washingtonpost.com 1 640 088 rawstory.com 297 256
politico.com 1 173 717 nbcnews.com 512 056 politicususa.com 293 419
thedailybeast.com 378 931 abcnews.go.com 467 533 dailykos.com 270 509
wsj.com 310 416 theguardian.com 439 580 time.com 252 468
usatoday.com 303 928 vox.com 369 789 talkingpointsmemo.com 199 346
bloomberg.com 266 662 slate.com 279 438 motherjones.com 179 685
reuters.com 248 753 buzzfeed.com 278 642 msnbc.com 177 090
businessinsider.com 239 423 cbsnews.com 232 889 mediamatters.org 152 160
apnews.com 138 496 politifact.com 198 095 newyorker.com 131 695
realclearpolitics.com 128 417 nydailynews.com 188 769 thinkprogress.org 107 776
observer.com 128 043 theatlantic.com 177 637 salon.com 104 199
fivethirtyeight.com 124 268 mediaite.com 152 877 nymag.com 89 077
bbc.com 118 176 newsweek.com 149 490
npr.org 59 931 latimes.com 122 741
cnb.cx 87 094
cnbc.com 68 830
Table 7: Hostnames of the websites in the categories center, left leaning, and left news media.
We also report the number of tweets with a URL pointing toward each hostname. Tweets with several URLs
are counted multiple times.
client name number of tweets with a URL
Twitter for iPhone 14 215 411
Twitter Web Client 13 045 560
Twitter for Android 10 192 781
Twitter for iPad 3 355 197
Facebook 1 254 619
TweetDeck 1 079 637
Mobile Web (M5) 951 749
Mobile Web 452 812
Google 410 514
Twitter for Windows 200 088
Twitter for Windows Phone 170 529
Mobile Web (M2) 161 682
Twitter for BlackBerry 93 937
iOS 72 334
Twitter for Android Tablets 56 007
Twitter for Mac 43 993
OS X 40 642
Twitter for BlackBerry 25 140
Table 8: List of Twitter official clients. We also display the number of tweets containing a URL and
originating from each official client. The number of tweets with a URL originating from official clients represent
82% of the total number of tweets with a URL.
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largest connected component, called the giant component of the network.
Here, we consider a directed version of the algorithm corresponding to a percolation of the weakly-
connected giant component, the largest maximal set of nodes where there exists a path in at least one
direction between each pair of nodes, where we target the super-sources of information.
Following the procedure described in Ref. [31], we first compute the value of CI`,out(i) for all nodes
i = 1, ..., N as
CI`,out(i) = (kout(i)− 1)
∑
j∈∂Bout(i,`)
kout(j)>0
(kout(j)− 1) , (3)
where ` is the radius of the ball around each node we consider, here we use ` = 2, kout(i) is the
out-degree of node i and ∂Bout(i, `) is the set of nodes situated at a distance ` from node i computed
by following outgoing paths from i. The node with the largest CI`,out value is then removed from the
network and the value of CI`,out of nodes whose value is changed by this removal is recomputed. This
procedure is repeated until the size of the weakly connected largest component becomes negligible.
The order of removal of the nodes corresponds to the final ranking of the network influencers shown
in Tab. 3.
3.2 Time series processing
In order to perform the cross-correlation and Granger-causality analysis of the activity time series,
we had to process the time series to remove the trend and circadian activity cycles and to deal with
missing data points. For each missing data points, we remove the entire day corresponding to the
missing observation in order to keep the period of the circadian activity consistent over the entire time
series. This is necessary to apply filtering technique to remove the periodic component of the time
series. When removing an entire day, we consider that the day starts and ends at 4 am, corresponding
to the time of the day with lowest Twitter activity. We removed a total of 24 days, representing 15%
of our observation period. We then applied a STL (seasonal-trend decomposition procedure based on
Loess) [33] procedure to extract the trend, seasonal and remainder components of each activity time
series. We only consider the remainder components for the cross-correlation and Granger-causality
analysis. We set the seasonal period of the STL filter equal to the number of observations per day,
np = 96, and the seasonal smoothing period to ns = 95, such that the seasonal component is smooth
and the remainder component retains the higher frequency signal containing the activity of interest.
Varying the value of the smoothing period to ns = 47 does not change significantly the results.
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